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THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND
PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATION:
THE PROMISE OF PROTECTION
FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Lynn R. Singband*
INTRODUCTION
Kermit Bunn appeared before a federal grand jury in response
to a subpoena requiring him to certify the authenticity of corporate
documents.' He refused to take the oath on the grounds that the
prosecutor was not licensed to practice in that state. After this re-
fusal, Bunn added, "I have legal paperwork on all of you [grand
jurors]. You need to go get legal counsel." The court reporter re-
corded these comments, and the district court charged Bunn with
contempt for threatening the grand jury. The court issued an order
to show cause based on the transcript of the grand jury proceedings
and the foreman's testimony that the grand jury members per-
ceived the comments as a threat. Bunn moved for discovery and
requested the tape recording of the grand jury proceedings. Al-
though the government did not object, it failed to produce the tape
and ultimately dismissed the charges, determining that the state-
ment on the tape was too vague to prove contempt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
Though not the most egregious example of prosecutorial miscon-
duct, this case nonetheless illustrates the lack of standards gov-
erning the conduct of investigations by federal prosecutors made
prior to their charging decisions as well as the lack of guidance
about the extent to which federal prosecutors should review evi-
dence on hand or reasonably available before bringing charges. 2
Because federal prosecutors have considerable involvement in the
pre-charging investigation and virtual free reign over the charging
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2002. My thanks to Professor Bruce
Green for his insight and guidance.
1. In re 1997 Grand Jury, 215 F.3d 430, 432-33 (4th Cir. 2000). The entire para-
graph references this case.
2. Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in the In-
vestigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 738-47 (1999) (explaining that prosecu-
tors' investigative role is not addressed by ethical authorities and suggesting that
prosecutors' broad investigative role should be limited by an ethics rule requiring a
proportionality analysis).
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decision, 3 it is reasonable to expect that they adhere to some basic
principles in conducting these investigations and in deciding what
and whom to charge.4 However, under existing standards set by
the United States Constitution, the United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ"), federal ethics rules, and the courts, federal prose-
cutors have very broad and vague guidelines to help them conduct
their pre-charging investigation and exercise their charging discre-
tion.5 Furthermore, the enforcement of these standards by the
courts, state disciplinary authorities, and the Office of Professional
Responsibility (DOJ's internal review board) is minimal and gen-
erally lenient.6
In 1997, Congress enacted the "Hyde Amendment," purportedly
in an effort to minimize prosecutorial abuse of power in the charg-
ing decision by creating a financial remedy for victims of egregious
prosecutorial action.7 The Hyde Amendment allows prevailing
criminal defendants with private counsel to collect "a reasonable
attorney's fee and other litigation expenses, where the court finds
that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in
bad faith."' Current judicial interpretation of the Hyde Amend-
ment standard raises the question of whether the courts' decisions
interpreting the law will add to the standard of conduct for prose-
3. Michael Q. English, Note, A Prosecutor's Use of Inconsistent Factual Theories
of a Crime in Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due Process Violation?, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 525, 531-32 (1999); Bennet L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53
U. Pirr. L. REV. 393, 395 (1992); Little, supra note 2, at 728-729.
4. See generally Little, supra note 2.
5. Infra Part I.B.
6. Infra Part I.C.
7. Infra Part II.A.
8. The Hyde Amendment states in full:
During fiscal year 1998 and in any fiscal year thereafter, the court, in any
criminal case (other than a case in which the defendant is represented by
assigned counsel paid for by the public) pending on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act ... may award to a prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation expenses,
where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious,
frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances
make such an award unjust. Such awards shall be granted pursuant to the
procedures and limitations (but not the burden of proof) provided for an
award under section 2412 of title 28, United States Code.... Fees and other
expenses awarded under this provision to a party shall be paid by the agency
over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency
by appropriation. No new appropriations shall be made as a result of this
provision.
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1998),
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000)).
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cutors established by pre-existing laws, regulations, and internal
guidelines. Commentators are also interested in the extent to
which the Hyde Amendment effectively deters prosecutors by in-
troducing financial considerations to the charging decision.
Part I of this Comment describes federal prosecutors' broad
charging discretion and the resulting potential for abuse. This Part
then examines and critiques the standard of conduct set for federal
prosecutors by the United States Constitution, the courts, the DOJ,
and ethics rules. Finally, this Part reviews and assesses the various
enforcement mechanisms used to insure compliance with the stan-
dards of conduct set by these various sources. Part II discusses
how current interpretations of the Hyde Amendment have failed
to establish a standard of conduct for federal prosecutors different
from that established by pre-existing laws, internal regulations, and
ethics rules. This Part then considers the effectiveness of the Hyde
Amendment as a deterrent mechanism and analyzes the Hyde
Amendment's success as a remedy for prevailing criminal defend-
ants. Part III argues that the Hyde Amendment offers the courts
an important opportunity to issue opinions detailing how federal
prosecutors should exercise their charging discretion.
I. PROSECUTORS' DISCRETIONARY POWER: WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND CURRENT REGULATION
A. The Breadth of Prosecutorial Discretion
Federal prosecutors wield an enormous amount of power with
broad discretion and few constraints or guidelines.9 Federal prose-
cutors have the authority to bring charges, decide what charges to
bring, make sentencing recommendations, and control the plea
bargaining process. 10 The decision to charge, in particular, puts the
9. For more in-depth analysis and coverage of prosecutorial discretion see
Gershman, supra, note 3, at 405-09 (explaining expansive power and uncontrolled
discretion of prosecutors); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the
Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325 (1997) (recognizing prosecu-
tors' broad power and the need for judicial review of prosecutorial discretion in order
to effectively combat selective prosecution); Elkan Abramowitz, The Hyde Amend-
ment and Wrongful Federal Prosecutions, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 1998, at 3 (quoting Michael
E. Shaheen, Jr., the counsel and lawyer-in-chief of the DOJ's Office of Professional
Responsibility). See generally Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of
Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000) (suggesting
education as a response to broad, unfettered prosecutorial discretion).
10. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL: PRINCIPLES OF FED-
ERAL PROSECUTION 9-27.000, 9-2.010-2.145 (2000) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL]. The
Principles of Federal Prosecution were originally promulgated by Attorney General
2001] 1969
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federal prosecutor in an extremely powerful position.' The Princi-
ples of Federal Prosecution ("Principles"), the internal manual for
the DOJ, only requires a federal prosecutor to demonstrate proba-
ble cause by finding that an individual has likely committed a fed-
eral offense before deciding to bring charges. After finding
probable cause, the federal prosecutor has discretion in deciding
which steps to take next in pursuing an investigation or prosecu-
tion.12 Generally, commentators and courts list the same reasons
for allowing prosecutors such broad discretion: the need to effi-
ciently use limited resources; prosecutorial expertise in making dis-
cretionary decisions; the danger of chilling law enforcement efforts;
the potential need for leniency; the danger of a potential increase
in frivolous claims by defendants, and the harm to effective crime
control a lack of discretion might induce. 13
The broad discretion given to federal prosecutors in making the
charging decision can result in innocent people losing their free-
Benjamin R. Civiletti on July 28, 1980 and describe the authority of theprosecutor,
prosecutors' procedural requirements, and specific instructions as to the prosecution
of specific offenses, but not standards or guidelines for exercising prosecutorial discre-
tion. Id. Policy limitations on the authority of the United States Attorney to decline
prosecutions, to prosecute, and to take other specified action with respect to prosecu-
tion of criminal cases are outlined in 9-2.400, Prior Approvals Chart. Id. at 9-2.400.
11. Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial
Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion-Knowing There
Will Be Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371 (2000) (reviewing the
breadth of prosecutors' discretion and arguing that defendants have little recourse in
response to unchecked prosecutorial discretion); Gershman, supra note 3, at 405, 408;
Podgor, supra note 9, at 1516-17.
12. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 10, at 9-27.200. A finding of probable cause is
made according to the same standard as that used for the issuance of an arrest war-
rant or a summons upon a complaint. A finding of probable cause is necessary to
prosecute but does not mandate prosecution. Upon a finding of probable cause, a
prosecutor has five choices: 1) investigate further; 2) prosecute; 3) decline prosecution
and refer to another jurisdiction for consideration; 4) decline prosecution and recom-
mend pre-trial diversion or other non-criminal disposition; or 5) decline prosecution
and take no other action. Subsequent sections of the DOJ Manual elaborate on con-
siderations for the prosecutor to take into account in deciding what course to follow.
Id. at 9-27.220. The prosecutor may not consider race, religion, sex, national origin,
political affiliations, personal feelings, or the effect the decision will have on the pros-
ecutor's professional or personal circumstances. Id. at 9-27.260.
13. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (limiting judicial review
of prosecutorial charging discretion in light of the presumption that prosecutors
"properly discharged their official duties") (citations omitted); JOSEPH F. LAWLESS
JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 3.02-3.07, 3.28 (2d ed. 1999); Heller, supra note
9, at 1326; Lawrence Judson Welle, Power, Policy, and the Hyde Amendment: Ensur-
ing Sound Judicial Interpretation of the Criminal Attorneys' Fees Law, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 333, 351-55 (1999).
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dom. 4 While conviction and sentencing to prison or death is cer-
tainly the worst result of prosecutorial abuse of power, the effect of
a grand jury subpoena alone can be devastating. 5 Federal prose-
cutors' exercise of broad discretion in the charging decision has led
to convictions and death sentences for defendants despite the exis-
tence of evidence demonstrating their innocence. 16 This broad dis-
cretion also has allowed prosecutors to pursue investigations
relentlessly despite lacking cause to do so17 and has even permitted
them to press charges they subsequently dismissed. The following
section reviews the federal prosecutors' standard of conduct estab-
lished by various sources and explains how wrongful convictions
are made possible because of limited guidance as to what is a legiti-
mate exercise of the charging' power. 18
B. Current Standard of Conduct for Prosecutors
1. The Judiciary
Courts have limited authority to establish a standard of conduct
for prosecutors. The constitutional standard prohibiting selective
or vindictive prosecution 9 sets a high burden of proof for defend-
14. See generally Elkan Abramowitz & Peter Scher, The Hyde Amendment: Con-
gress Creates a Toehold for Curbing Wrongful Prosecution, CHAMPION, March 1998, at
22, 23; Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6
UNIV. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 75-83 (1999) (discussing wrongful prosecutions
and how long people spend in jail before their innocence is demonstrated, and refer-
ring to the works of Edwin M. Bouchard, Edward Conners, Judge Jerome Frank and
Barbara Frank); Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial
Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083,
1084-87 (1994) (explaining that examples of prosecutorial abuse of power are on the
rise).
15. Hon. John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of
the Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 423, 425-26 (1997) (discussing
the negative impact of a grand jury subpoena, an investigation, and an indictment).
16. Moore, supra note 11, at 371-74 (using the example of the conviction and sen-
tencing to death of Rolando Cruz to illustrate abuse of prosecutorial discretion).
17. David W. Simon, Fighting Back: Remedies for the Wrongfully Prosecuted?,
WISCONSIN LAWYER, September 1998, at 10-11 (referring to how the absurd prosecu-
tion of Marsha Jones for Medicare fraud resulted in the destruction of her business).
18. See generally Bernhard, supra note 14; Gershman, supra note 3, at 409 (dis-
cussing the downsides of discretion especially in death penalty cases); David Horan,
The Innocence Commission: An Independent Review Board for Wrongful Convictions,
20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 91, nn. 1, 4-7 & 14 (explaining that many states, Illinois in
particular, are rethinking their death penalty policies and procedures after consistent
and compelling indications based on DNA testing that innocent people are being sen-
tenced to death).
19. During and after the trial, defendants may bring complaints of prosecutorial
misconduct, specifically charges of selective or vindictive prosecution, to the judge's
attention. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978). A claim of selective
2001] 1971
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ants to satisfy before they may bring a claim in an effort to have
their convictions dismissed. 20 Because of the high standard, very
few defendants are able to bring constitutional claims and even
fewer prevail.2' Courts also have a general supervisory authority,
which allows judges to set procedural standards in their courtrooms
"to deter governmental misconduct and preserve judicial integ-
rity."'22 However, the Supreme Court has construed that judicial
authority very narrowly.23 Therefore, judges have little ability to
set a standard of conduct for federal prosecutors, as their ability to
enforce a standard is severely limited.
or vindictive prosecution alleges that the prosecutor denied the defendant equal pro-
tection of the law or due process as a result of the defendant's race, class, gender, or
some grudge the prosecutor has against the defendant. Margaret E. McGhee,
Prosecutorial Discretion, 88 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1061-62 (2000); Lesley E. Williams, Note,
The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FOROHAM L. REV. 3441, 3447-48 (1999);
David S. Rudolf & Thomas K. Maher, Behind Closed Doors: Selective Prosecu-
tions-Questioning the Motives, CHAMPION, June 1996, at 31, 33 ("claimant must
demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory effect and that
it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."') (quoting United States v. Armstrong
517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)).
20. Rudolf & Maher, supra note 19, at 31 (discussing the decision in United States
v. Armstrong and the resulting burden on the defendant to win the discovery motion
necessary to prove a selective prosecution claim). See generally Heller, supra note 9.
21. The courts generally only override a prosecutor's discretionary decision when
the prosecutor's conduct is so egregious that the defendant suffered prejudice or vio-
lation of his constitutional rights. The court relies on a harmless error test; a prosecu-
tor's improper argument will not justify reversal if it is a harmless error. See United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-10 (1983); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good
Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 900 (1995) (discussing the availability of reversal of convic-
tion if prosecutor's misconduct resulted in the violation of defendant's constitutional
rights); Morton supra note 14, at 1103 (explaining that there are two standards for the
harmless error test depending on whether the defendant claims there was a constitu-
tional or non-constitutional error). The defendant must demonstrate that the prose-
cutor's conduct prejudiced him and caused a different result in the case than would
have occurred had the prosecutor not behaved improperly. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 510-
11; Gershman, supra note 3, at 424-27 (arguing that because the standard for proving
the harmless error test is so high, the wrong incentive is given to prosecutors); Moore,
supra note 11, at 388 n.118.
22. Gershman, supra note 3, at 432. Under their supervisory powers, courts can
dismiss cases or indictments in response to ethical misconduct on the part of the pros-
ecutor that caused prejudice to the defendant. Morton, supra note 14, at 1089.
23. Gershman, supra note 3, at 432 (citing three reasons why the supervisory
power is little deterrent or control over prosecutorial misconduct: judges are reluctant
to act, exercise of supervisory powers is viewed as an intrusion on the separation of
powers, and the exercise of supervisory powers is subservient to the harmless error
rule, making it irrelevant).
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2. The Criminal Justice System: Indictment
Despite the limitations on courts in establishing and enforcing a
standard of conduct, the justice system as a whole sets standards
for the different phases of prosecution. In order to obtain an in-
dictment and pursue prosecution, the federal prosecutor must
demonstrate to a grand jury the existence of probable cause for
pressing specific charges against defendants. 24 To satisfy the proba-
ble cause standard, prosecutors must demonstrate that they have
reason "to believe that the accused committed an offense. ' 25 The
prosecutor need only present inculpatory evidence to the grand
jury.26 Additionally, only the prosecutor presents evidence to the
grand jury, making it difficult for jurors not to take the prosecu-
tor's side. Across the board, practitioners acknowledge that if the
prosecutor wants a grand jury indictment, the prosecutor will get
one.2 7 Federal prosecutors and government officials even admit
that the probable cause standard fails to act as a screening mecha-
nism.28 Although the general public perceives the grand jury sys-
tem as an institution designed to weed out improper and
unwarranted prosecutions by requiring proof of probable cause, in
reality it is a "rubber stamp" for the prosecutor's charging
decision. 9
3. The Criminal Justice System: Trial
Once federal prosecutors obtain an indictment, they move to the
trial phase where they must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
24. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364; Roberta Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Up-
dating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors,
37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 938 (1996) (explaining what a prosecutor should know to file
charges). See generally Moore, supra note 11, at 381; Roger Roots, If It's Not a Run-
away, It's Not a Real Grand Jury, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 821, 825-27 (2000).
25. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.
26. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963) (requiring government to pro-
vide defendant with exculpatory evidence); Podgor, supra note 9, at 1515 (referring to
holding in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992), that prosecutors need not
present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury).
27. Roots, supra note 24, at 826; Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 7 ("Congress has
clearly acknowledged the simple truth that the grand jury process no longer serves its
historical protective function and now merely exists as a charging mechanism for the
prosecutor's office."); John Gibeaut, Indictment of a System, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2001, at
34, 36 (explaining that the Supreme Court views the grand jury as an untouchable
fourth branch of government).
28. Gerald B. Lefcourt, High Time for a Bill of Rights for the Grand Jury, CHAM-
PION, April 1998, at 5 (referring to Henry Hyde's quotation of William J. Campbell's
comments regarding the ease with which prosecutors obtain indictments).
29. Roots, supra note 24, at 827.
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doubt.3" However, since the charging decision is limited solely by
the easily satisfied probable cause standard, defendants may be
dragged through the early stages of prosecution before a thorough
investigation, or the defendant's presentation of evidence at trial,
makes it apparent that the evidence is insufficient to support the
charges. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard may help to vin-
dicate some defendants who are acquitted, but, sometimes, acquit-
tal brings little satisfaction after a lengthy investigation and
indictment.3 1
4. Department of Justice
In the Principles, the DOJ "provide[s] Federal prosecutors [with]
a statement of sound prosecutorial policies and practices for partic-
ularly important areas of their work."'32 According to the Princi-
ples, federal prosecutors should prosecute if they believe an
individual's conduct constitutes a federal criminal offense and the
evidence is sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction. 33 Federal
prosecutors should not pursue a prosecution if "[n]o substantial
Federal interest would be served by prosecution; [t]he person is
subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; [or] [t]here
exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. ' 34 The
comment to this section of the Principles advises government attor-
neys not to prosecute unless the evidence will convince the trier of
fact.35 This statement does not imply that the prosecutor should
have all the evidence at the time of deciding whether to prosecute,
but that the prosecutor should have faith in the availability of the
evidence at trial.36
While the Principles are not enforceable by a defendant through
litigation, they are intended to guide federal prosecutors in their
decision making so that prosecutorial decisions are made "ration-
ally and objectively according to the merits of each case."37 The
30. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (explaining that proving guilt of a crim-
inal charge requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
31. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
32. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 10, at 9-27.001.
33. Id. at 9-27.220.
34. Id.
35. Id. at cmt. The prosecutor cannot be influenced by the individual's race, relig-
ion, sex, national origin, political affiliations, the prosecutor's personal feelings or the
effect the decision will have on the prosecutor's professional or personal circum-
stances. See id. at 9-27.260.
36. Id.
37. Id. The preface to the Principles acknowledges the significant consequences of
the decision to prosecute and explains that this decision is a balance between the
1974
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United States Attorney's Office has a hierarchical structure that
provides oversight and approval of all decision making, yet, ulti-
mately, the soundness of prosecutors' decisions relies on the "char-
acter, integrity, sensitivity, and competence" of the people chosen
to serve as federal prosecutors.38 Defendants must rely on the
DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility ("OPR") to review
prosecutors' decision making for misconduct.39 Because there is no
independent enforcement of the Principles, and even though the
standard expressed is high, in application, federal prosecutors are
only held to a probable cause, sufficiency of the evidence standard
with respect to their charging decisions.4a
5. Ethics Standards
All lawyers are regulated by codes of professional responsibility,
and prosecutors are also subject to their own ethical standards.41
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct,42 for example, prohibit a lawyer from suborning perjury,43 re-
interests of society in having its laws enforced and the recognition that prosecution
has a profound effect on the accused and his family. The significance of the decision
then requires that it be regulated to avoid inconsistency while still allowing flexibility.
See id. at 9-27.140 (noting that while consistency is important, the need for flexibility
is necessary to respond to different conditions in the interest of fair and effective law
enforcement); see also id. at 9-27.150 (discussing the enforceability of these stan-
dards); id. at 9-27.120 (explaining that each DOJ attorney should be guided by these
principles and that each United States Attorney (USA) and each Assistant Attorney
General (AAG) should communicate these principles to the attorneys within his of-
fice and under his supervision); id. at 9-27.130 (stating that each USA and each AAG
is responsible for ensuring that prosecutorial decisions are made at the appropriate
level of responsibility and according to the Principles and that departures from the
Principles are addressed with remedial action including disciplinary sanctions. This
section, however, does not define what decisions are appropriate for each level of
responsibility or what remedial action is appropriate when improper decisions are
made.).
38. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 10, at 9-27.001.
39. Infra Part I.C.3.
40. See discussion infra Part I.C.3.
41. Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Pro-
duce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 73-4 (1995) (explaining that
lawyers are subject to the ethical code of the state in which they are admitted for
practice and the professional standards incorporated in the rules of the district courts
where they practice).
42. Id. at 73 (indicating that most states have adopted either the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility or the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
as their standards for professional conduct).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2000); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980).
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quire a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence, 4 describe the
prosecutor as a "seek[er of] justice,' 45 and set probable cause as
the standard for making the charging decision. 46  The courts en-
force the ethics rules through state disciplinary authorities.47
C. Enforcement Mechanisms
Prosecutorial charging discretion is generally unregulated, and
commentators consider current regulatory mechanisms
inadequate.48
1. State Disciplinary Authorities
If a federal prosecutor violates an ethical duty, a judge or an-
other attorney may refer the prosecutor to a state disciplinary au-
thority for a hearing and possible sanctions.4 9 Unfortunately, this
remedy is largely ineffective. Most states do not publicize the filing
or disposition of complaints, and state disciplinary authorities,
which hear few complaints of prosecutorial misconduct, are un-
likely to impose sanctions.50 According to one analysis, "the [state]
disciplinary process [is] almost entirely ineffective in defining and
deterring prosecutorial misconduct."'" As a result, lawyers, and
specifically prosecutors, cannot learn from their colleagues' mis-
takes and understand what behavior is required to satisfy ethical
obligations and avoid misconduct complaints.52 The complaint
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2000); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13, DR 7-103 (1980).
45. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2000); MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1980).
47. See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
48. Green, supra note 41, at 91 (arguing that current control methods are inade-
quate because each assumes the other will respond to misconduct); Abramowitz &
Scher, supra note 14, at 22 (describing the power of DOJ as a "Leviathan ... no
outsider is capable of oversight"). See generally Panel Discussion: The Regulation and
Ethical Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 737 (1999);
Morton, supra note 14.
49. Green, supra note 41, at 88.
50. Id. at 88-90; Morton, supra note 14, at 1104-05 (explaining that DOJ protects
prosecutors from state disciplinary authorities which generally do not impose sanc-
tions and, when they do, impose lenient ones).
51. Gershman, supra note 3, at 444 (describing the "failure of professional discipli-
nary organizations to deal with such misconduct"); Green, supra note 41, at 88.
52. Green, supra note 41, at 88-89 (discussing how the secrecy of state disciplinary
proceedings inhibits their effectiveness as a guide for prosecutors as to what is mis-
conduct and concluding that such proceedings provide little deterrence).
1976
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mechanism also is considered ineffective because state disciplinary
authorities are typically underfunded and understaffed.53
In addition, the ethics standards enforced by state disciplinary
authorities do not create substantive rights or causes of action for
defendants. 4 Thus, while a lawyer may be sanctioned for an ethics
violation, the affected party has no recourse under the rules for the
attorney's conduct.55 Any sanction imposed on a prosecutor is a
personal sanction, which provides no relief for defendants.
2. Judiciary
Courts may issue a public reprimand, hold the prosecutor in con-
tempt, or impose a fine on the prosecutor for misconduct in the
trial proceedings, but such discipline rarely occurs. 56 Rulings es-
tablishing a presumption that the prosecutor has acted appropri-
ately constrain the judiciary's ability to sanction improper
behavior.57 Courts infrequently reprimand attorneys because they
tend to defer to prosecutors' decision making. 8 Thus, while public
reprimand by the court is significant, it is a rare occurrence, and
has a limited impact.59 Courts also can hold an attorney in con-
tempt, but this occurs only in limited circumstances, because most
prosecutorial conduct that could be considered improper is not
subject to contempt charges. 60  Additionally, to obtain relief
through a claim of selective or vindictive prosecution, the defen-
dant must satisfy a prohibitively high burden of proof.61
53. Meares, supra note 21, at 899 (citing Professor Richard Rosen's analysis of the
limited use of state regulatory mechanisms as a response to professional misconduct).
54. Morton, supra note 14, at 1099.
55. The affected party may have recourse through the judiciary on some other
grounds. For example, the defense attorney may charge prosecutorial misconduct as a
result of an improper closing argument and in response seek relief for his client.
Green, supra note 41, at 78-79.
56. For more on the power of courts to curb prosecutorial abuses of power and
their reluctance to use those tools see the following sources: Fred C. Zacharias &
Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L. J. 207, 240-42
(2000); Morton, supra note 14, at 1089-91.
57. Abramowitz & Scher, supra note 14, at 23.
58. United States v. Reyes, 16 F. Supp. 2d 759, 761 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (recognizing
that courts should exercise restraint when reviewing prosecutorial decisions).
59. Green, supra note 41, at 81-82 (indicating that the impact of public reprimand
by a court can be significant because prosecutors care about their reputations, but
explaining that district courts rarely "act as disciplinarians").
60. Id. at 80-81 (explaining that most conduct considered wrongful occurs outside
of court and that it is unusual for courts to provide procedural relief); Meares, supra
note 21, at 893-94 (discussing the rare use of contempt by courts despite its effective-
ness and appropriateness as a response to prosecutorial misconduct).
61. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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3. Office of Professional Responsibility
As the internal review mechanism for DOJ, OPR has significant
potential to guide prosecutors exercising their discretionary au-
thority by enforcing the standard set out in the Principles. How-
ever, OPR has not taken advantage of its authority and access to
information to enforce more than the minimal sufficiency of the
evidence standard on prosecutors' charging decisions. OPR has
only sanctioned outrageous violations of the charging power.
The Attorney General created OPR in 197562 to "investigate al-
legations of misconduct by Department of Justice attorneys that
relate to the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate or
provide legal advice."63 OPR reports the outcome of its investiga-
tions to the appropriate management officials in the Department of
Justice and, if disciplinary action is warranted, makes a recommen-
dation as to the range of possible sanctions.64 The supervisory offi-
cial may choose not to follow the recommendation, but, if he acts
contrary to the recommendation, he must notify the Office of the
Deputy Attorney General.
Beginning in 1993, OPR has released an annual summary of re-
ports of investigations where there was a finding of intentional mis-
conduct; a demonstrated public interest in the allegations of
serious professional misconduct; and an attorney subject to the in-
vestigation who requested disclosure.66 Because of privacy con-
cerns, very few OPR decisions are made public, 67 and those
decisions included in the annual summary do not disclose the pros-
ecutors' names and provide very little background or information
regarding the bases for the decisions.68
OPR investigations generally occur at the behest of private par-
ties, DOJ staff, private attorneys, judges, Congress, inmates and
detainees. 69 The office investigates a wide range of prosecutorial
62. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 1996
ANN. REP. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 REPORT].
63. Id. at Jurisdiction and Functions.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also Letter from Philip B. Heymann, Deputy Attorney General, to
Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Counsel, Office of Professional Responsibility (Dec. 13,
1993) (on file with author and available from OPR).
67. 1996 REPORT at Jurisdiction and Functions.
68. See, e.g., 1996 REPORT at Examples of Matters Handled by OPR in Fiscal Year
1996.
69. Each annual report released by OPR contains statistics on referrals, the rea-
sons for investigation, and the results of the investigations. See, e.g., id. at Statistical
Summary of OPR Activities in Fiscal Year 1996.
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actions,7° including the prosecutor's decision to pursue prosecu-
tion,7' the prosecutor's investigative activities,72 and the prosecu-
tor's decision to dismiss charges.73 OPR also investigates charges
that prosecutors are violating legal requirements such as the obli-
gation to disclose exculpatory information 74 and the duty not to
suborn perjury.75
70. Podgor, supra note 9, at 1527-28 ("OPR typically investigates the role of the
prosecutor in cases involving allegations such as '[a]buse of prosecutorial or investiga-
tive authority,' '[m]isrepresentation to the court or opposing counsel,' '[u]nauthorized
release of information ... ,' [i]mproper oral or written remarks to the court or grand
jury,' and '[c]onflicts of interest.'") (citations omitted).
71. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC SUMMARY OF
OPR's REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT MADE
AGAINST ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY JACK FRELS CONCERNING UNITED STATES V.
SALINAS, ET AL. AND UNITED STATES V. U.S. CURRENCY (1'994) [hereinafter FRELS
INVESTIGATION] (investigation of allegation that prosecution was in bad faith).
72. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF THE IN-
VESTIGATION BY THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY INTO THE CONDUCT
OF ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY PAUL KANTER CONCERNING UNITED
STATES V. VAN ENGEL (1995) [hereinafter KANTER INVESTIGATION] (investigation of
prosecutor's investigation of defendant's attorney for obstruction of justice).
73. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 1997
ANN. REP. Examples of Matters Handled by OPR in Fiscal Year 1997, ex. 16 (1997)
[hereinafter 1997 REPORT] (determining that decision to dismiss charges was not out
of concern arising from defendant's claim of vindictive charging).
74. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 1.998
ANN. REP. Examples of Matters Handled by OPR in Fiscal Year 1998, ex. 1 (1998)
[hereinafter 1998 REPORT] (finding reckless disregard of prosecutorial obligation in
failure to produce discoverable material requested by defendant); 1997 REPORT,
supra note 73 at Examples of Matters Handled by OPR in Fiscal Year 1997, ex. 1
(finding multiple discovery violations were not intentional but an established pattern
of conduct indicative of prosecutorial misconduct that justified written reprimand);
OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGA-
TION BY THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY INTO THE CONDUCT OF As.
SISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY JOSEPH FRATrALONE (1996) [hereinafter
FRATTALONE INVESTIGATION] (finding that attorney intentionally attempted to with-
hold information from OPR); but see 1998 REPORT at Examples of Matters Handled
by OPR in Fiscal Year 1998, ex. 6 (finding no professional misconduct resulting from
failure to disclose exculpatory information because attorney made a good faith assess-
ment of the discoverability of the materials); OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF MISCONDUCT ALLEGA-
TIONS IN UNITED STATES V. ISGRO (1994) [hereinafter ISGRO INVESTIGATION] (find-
ing no intentional violation of disclosure obligation because of prosecutor's
reasonable belief that evidence need not be turned over, but reprimanding prosecutor
for failing to review testimony to determine necessity of disclosure); OFFICE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 1994 ANN. REP. Matters in
Which Allegations Were Found to be Unsubstantiated, para. 10-11 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 REPORT] (finding no violation of obligation to disclose exculpatory information
because DOJ attorney relied on trusted Internal Revenue Service agent and original
search for documents).
75. FRELS INVESTIGATION, supra note 71; 1998 REPORT, supra note 74 at Exam-
ples of Matters Investigated by OPR in Fiscal Year ex. 17 (investigating charge of sub-
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There is some deterrent effect from a public reprimand by OPR
because of the reluctance of prosecutors to have their names pub-
licly associated with misconduct.76 The effect is limited, though,
because of the general unavailability of OPR decisions and the lim-
ited nature of their content. OPR decisions often are reported
only in summary format and published without any names.77 Also,
it is difficult for OPR to stay abreast of all complaints of
prosecutorial misconduct and fully investigate each one with the
resources currently available to the office.78
Furthermore, OPR review may reflect organizational bias be-
cause it relies on prosecutors sanctioning fellow prosecutors.79
Consider the potential conflicts arising from the United States At-
torney's Office investigating the behavior of one of its prosecutors
in response to a charge of misconduct. Such an investigation po-
tentially implicates all United States Attorneys, because bad be-
havior on the part of one federal prosecutor reflects poorly on all.
Because an OPR review of a prosecutor threatens to implicate the
prosecutor's entire office, it may have more of a deterrent effect.
That, however, does not appear to be the case because OPR rarely
sanctions prosecutors.8 ° It is only in the most egregious cases,
where a prosecutor has violated the law or has been so negligent as
to demonstrate willful disregard of duties, that OPR imposes sanc-
tions.81 By requiring extreme malfeasance, OPR does little to clar-
ify how extensive an investigation prosecutors should complete in
order to be certain that they have sufficient evidence to justify
prosecution.
ornation of perjury and finding the prosecutor reasonably did not know the material
was false and had reason to believe it was true).
76. Green, supra note 41, at 81 (indicating that federal prosecutors care about
their reputations).
77. Id. at 86.
78. Meares, supra note 21, at 899 (describing how eight attorneys cannot patrol
the activities of 7500 attorneys). The author later suggests that perhaps additional
resources would improve the effect of current mechanisms to control prosecutorial
misconduct. Id. at 901.
79. See Abramowitz & Scher, supra note 14, at 23 (arguing that inside attempts to
control DOJ have failed); Michael E. Clark, Nothing to Hyde? The Flood of Wrongful
Recovery Suits Has Not Materialized, GRIM. JUST., Summer 1999, at 10, 16 ("[T]he
DOJ's self-policing efforts have simply been inadequate protection for those individu-
als who have been harmed by aberrant prosecutors and agents.").
80. See, e.g., 1998 REPORT, supra note 74 at Statistical Summary of OPR Activities
in Fiscal Year 1998 para. 4 (indicating that only 15% of the matters closed that year
resulted in finding of professional misconduct).
81. Morton, supra note 14, at 1109 (noting that "frequently no action is taken").
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II. THE HYDE AMENDMENT: PASSAGE AND INTERPRETATION
A. Prosecution of One of Their Own Prompted Congress to
Enact the Hyde Amendment
In response to an eight-year investigation of Congressman Jo-
seph McDade for bribery and racketeering that concluded with an
acquittal, Congressmen John Murtha introduced a provision in the
House of Representatives granting members of Congress and their
staff attorneys' fees upon prevailing in a criminal case in which
they were accused. 82 In 1997, Congressman Henry Hyde presented
the proposal to the House of Representatives as a response to sub-
stantially unjustified and frivolous prosecutions resulting from
prosecutorial abuse of power.83
Congressman Hyde expanded the language of what is now called
the "Hyde Amendment" (the "Amendment") to allow all prevail-
ing criminal defendants with private counsel to collect attorneys'
fees unless the government could demonstrate that its position was
substantially justified.84 The final Amendment states:
[T]he court, in any criminal case (other than a case in which the
defendant is represented by assigned counsel paid for by the
public) . . ., may award to a prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney's fee and other litigation expenses, where the court
finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivo-
lous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circum-
stances make such an award unjust. '85
82. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 2267 Before the Comm. of the
Whole, 105th Congress, H7791 (1997) [hereinafter HEARINGS] (statement of Rep.
Henry Hyde); Abramowitz, supra note 9; T.R. Goldman, Putting a Price Tag on Ac-
quittals, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997, at 2.
83. HEARINGS, supra note 82, at H7791 (stating that "[p]eople in government, ex-
ercising government power ... are capable of overreaching ... [and] pushing people
around").
84. Congressman John Murtha's original bill limited the attorneys' fees award to
members of Congress or members of their staff and only required that they be acquit-
ted to collect. Id. Hyde originally proposed requiring the government to demonstrate
its position was substantially justified to avoid payment of attorneys' fees, but in its
final form, the Amendment placed the burden on the defendant to prove the govern-
ment's position was vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith. Id; Departments of Com-
merce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (codified and amended as 18
U.S.C. § 3006A (1997)).
85. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519,
(codified and amended as 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1997)).
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Hyde easily garnered support for the Amendment from Congress 86
at a time when the public in general was exhibiting discontent with
federal law enforcement agencies.87
According to the legislative history recording Congressman
Hyde's arguments in favor of this rider to the 1997 Appropriations
bill,88 Hyde intended for the Amendment to provide defendants
with the same remedy in the criminal arena available to defendants
in the civil arena when the government improperly uses its power
and thereby causes significant harm to people. 89  The Hyde
Amendment reflected Congressman Hyde's concern that broad
prosecutorial discretion in making the charging decision occasion-
ally results in aggressive prosecution of innocent people who are
hurt financially and personally with virtually no remedy.90 He ar-
gued in favor of "repair[ing] the [economic] wound" inflicted by
the government's over zealousness and abuse of power in exercis-
ing its discretionary charging power.91 Congressman Hyde indi-
cated that the award of attorneys' fees through the Hyde
Amendment would curb improper prosecutions, restrain the gov-
ernment's abuse of power, and protect innocent defendants.92
86. Goldman, supra note 82 (citing the Hyde Amendment as an example of the
new coalition consisting of the right and left including such groups as the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and mainstream conservative law and order
groups).
87. Welle, supra note 13, at 339-342 (undermining the widespread support implied
by the wide margin in favor of the bill by highlighting the limited consideration given
to the bill before its passage, yet also conceding the "pervasive public ... hostility
toward federal law enforcement organizations" and the alliance between liberals and
conservatives in support of the measure). Welle refers to Waco, Ruby Ridge, and
allegations of and investigations into FBI and IRS misconduct to illustrate the reason
for the public perception that federal agencies were out of control. Id.; see also Mor-
ton, supra note 14, at 1085 (referring to the "public's growing concern regarding attor-
ney misconduct").
88. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519
(1998).
89. HEARINGS, supra note 82, at H7791. Congressman Hyde was referring to the
Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994) [hereinafter EAJA], which al-
lows civil defendants to sue the government for attorneys' fees and the costs of litiga-
tion when the government loses the litigation. Id.
90. HEARINGS, supra note 82, at H7791 ("If the Government, your last resort, is
your oppressor, you really have no place to turn.") Id.; Abramowitz & Scher, supra
note 14, at 23 ("This legislation may go a long way toward providing judicial oversight
of DOJ's excesses.").
91. HEARINGS, supra note 82, at H7791.
92. Id. at H7791-H7793. Congressman Hyde suggested that justice, though per-
haps rough justice, meant reimbursement of attorneys' fees when the government was
willfully and frivolously wrong. Id. at H7791. Willfully and frivolously wrong govern-
ment behavior, according to Congressman Hyde, includes failure to disclose informa-
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B. Criticism of the Hyde Amendment
During the debate in Congress over the Hyde Amendment and
in the first months of its enactment, the DOJ argued that the Hyde
Amendment undermined the principle that the privilege of Ameri-
can citizenship includes the cost of "defending against a [criminal
prosecution]," commonly known as the "American Rule. ' 93 Advo-
cates of the Hyde Amendment expressed the belief that "defend-
ing against an abusive or unjustified prosecution should ... be an
exception to that rule. ' 94 DOJ representatives, however, feared
that making an exception to the American Rule by allowing pre-
vailing criminal defendants to sue for attorneys' fees would only
force federal prosecutors to waste resources defending against such
claims and would result in large payouts to criminal defendants.
Proponents of the Amendment argued that if criminal defendants
must make financially based decisions with respect to their de-
fense, then federal prosecutors should also have to keep "one eye
on their office budget" when making decisions regarding who to
charge.96
Critics of the Amendment also argued that forcing federal prose-
cutors to consider the pocketbook when making charging decisions
would stifle prosecution in that federal prosecutors would only try
unambiguous cases out of fear of having to pay attorneys' fees if
they lost.97 DOJ charged that the amendment would chill prosecu-
tion of difficult cases like rape, where convictions are hard to ob-
tain.98 However, in any criminal case, the prosecutor must prove
his case beyond a reasonable doubt.99 Since an acquittal alone is
insufficient to satisfy the Hyde Amendment standard, awarding at-
torneys' fees should not affect the decision to prosecute. 10
tion as obligated, failure to disclose exculpatory information, subornation of perjury,
and a lack of justification for bringing the suit. Id.
93. Abramowitz & Scher, supra note 14, at 23 (explaining that federal courts gen-
erally require each side to pay its own litigation costs).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Michael J. Sniffen, Reno Deputy Blasts Bill in Congress to Compensate Acquit-
ted Defendants, DAILY RECORD, Oct. 24, 1997, at 31 (quoting Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder).
97. Goldman, supra note 82 (explaining that critics maintained that the Hyde
Amendment would prevent all prosecutions but "the most open-and-shut cases").
98. Id.
99. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
100. In re 1997 Grand Jury, 215 F.3d 430, 436-37 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that dis-
missal of charges is not enough); United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th
Cir. 1999) (explaining that "[I]t is obvious that a lot more is required under the Hyde
Amendment than a showing that the defendant prevailed at the pre-trial, trial, or
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The Hyde Amendment originated, in part, as a way to offer
criminal defendants a remedy already available to civil defendants
through the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). 101 As a result,
the Hyde Amendment included the procedures of the EAJA, but
not its standard of proof.' °2 By incorporating civil law into criminal
law, the Hyde Amendment raised questions for some regarding the
fundamental differences between the civil and criminal systems.
According to some commentators, basing a criminal remedy on a
civil law was inappropriate, as there are fundamental differences
between criminal and civil litigation. 0 3 However, supporters main-
tained that the Hyde Amendment provided a much needed over-
sight mechanism to respond to prosecutors' abuse of power and the
inability of internal mechanisms and courts to control
prosecutors. 104
Other criticisms of the Hyde Amendment involve the ambiguity
of language in procedural guidelines that leave a great deal to the
courts' discretion.10 5 For instance, the Hyde Amendment language
does not explain who qualifies as a prevailing party. 10 6 According
to Lawrence Judson Welle, "the language of the Hyde Amendment
is grossly ambiguous and leaves the judiciary with an impermissible
degree of discretion in defining the scope of the law's applica-
tion. ' 10 7 He further explains that the lack of clarity in the procedu-
ral rules of the Hyde Amendment indicates sloppiness on
Congress's part in drafting the law.l °8 However, poor drafting says
appellate stages of the prosecution"); United States v. Pritt, 77 F. Supp. 2d 743, 748
(S.D. W. Va. 1999); United States v. Troisi, 13 F. Supp. 2d 595, 597 (N.D. W. Va.
1998). The government's attainment of a grand jury indictment does not preclude the
court from finding that the prosecution was vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith. HEAR-
ING, supra note 82, at H7793.
101. HEARINGS, supra note 82, at H7791; Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2412 (1994).
102. Abramowitz & Scher, supra note 14, at 24.
103. Welle, supra note 13, at 356-63; Goldman, supra note 82 (highlighting the dif-
ferences in burdens of proof and available safeguards in civil and criminal
procedures).
104. See, e.g., Abramowitz, supra note 9 (discussing how the Hyde Amendment
may help curb wrongful federal prosecutions).
105. Welle, supra note 13, at 370-78 (arguing that the ambiguity of the Hyde
Amendment language leaves too much to judges' discretion).
106. Simon, supra note 17, at 12.
107. Welle, supra note 13, at 334. An analysis of the appropriateness of such proce-
dural discretion is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, further analysis of
this area should occur to help insure that the courts implement the Hyde Amendment
effectively and appropriately.
108. See generally id. (discussing the numerous ways in which Congress erred in its
passage of the Hyde Amendment).
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little about the potential for courts to use the Hyde Amendment
standard to set a standard of conduct for federal prosecutors exer-
cising their charging discretion. The ambiguity of the language
leaves much to the courts' discretion; however, courts are not over-
stepping their authority in interpreting the statute. 109 If Congress
does not like the courts' interpretations, then Congress can change
the law. Otherwise, courts should apply the plain language of the
statute. 110
A related criticism invokes the belief that courts cannot review
the decision to charge because, unlike the prosecutor, the courts do
not have access to all the evidence."' However, the discovery pro-
vision of the Hyde Amendment allows "the court, for good cause
shown, [to] receive evidence ex parte and in camera" "[t]o deter-
mine whether or not to award fees and costs.""' 2 Therefore, evi-
dence that may be excluded at trial, which the prosecutor relied on
in making the decision to charge, is made available to the court for
review to determine the appropriateness of the government's deci-
sion to pursue charges.
Furthermore, Congress preserved judicial deference to the fed-
eral prosecutor by placing the burden of proof on the defendant." 3
Congress made this concession to the Clinton administration and
DOJ after both expressed concern with the government having to
prove that its position was substantially justified.114 This is reason-
109. The judiciary has a long history of reviewing executive decision-making and
the Hyde Amendment does not improperly displace the judiciary's historical defer-
ence to prosecutors. Heller, supra note 9, at 1340-41 (explaining that it is within the
courts' province to review agency action for abuse of discretion and that courts regu-
larly review prosecutorial actions for constitutional violations). In fact, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized the judicial authority to review federal prosecu-
tors' actions under their supervisory authority. John S. Austin, Note, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Substantial Assistance: The Power and Authority of Judicial Review-
United States v. Wade, 15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 263, 278-79 (1993); Morton, supra note
14, at 1089-90. The Court only balks at lower courts creating rights for third parties
not established by Congress or the Constitution and for imposing requirements on
prosecutors not established by Congress. See generally Gleeson, supra note 15 (dis-
cussing the supervisory authority of courts); but see Welle, supra note 13, at 342-56
(arguing that the Hyde Amendment violates principles of sovereign immunity, sepa-
ration of powers, and judicial restraint).
110. United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Chap-
man v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991)).
111. Welle, supra note 13, at 352-55.
112. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519
(1998).
113. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
114. Goldman, supra note 82.
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able, as it is legitimate to expect the prosecutor to act in the inter-
est of justice. On the occasions when the prosecutor does not,
however, it is right for Congress to provide the defendant with
some recourse and remedy.1 1 5
The courts offer an objective review of federal prosecutors' be-
havior that internal review cannot provide. 6 Strengthening inter-
nal controls, then, is inappropriate and ultimately ineffective, as
internal mechanisms are always subjective and lack independent
systemic oversight."1 ' As an objective third party, the judge can
review the record and any additional information made available
by discovery to determine if the prosecutor pursued charges im-
properly. The judge, as a neutral arbiter, decides based on the
presented information and offers both sides equal opportunity to
make their case. The judge, outside the influence of DOJ and neu-
tral to the plight of the defendant, faces no negative repercussions
for finding one way or another.
C. Current Interpretations of The Hyde Amendment
Since the Hyde Amendment took effect in 1998, courts have re-
solved a number of claims for attorneys' fees and, in doing so, they
have interpreted when "the position of the United States was vexa-
tious, frivolous, or in bad faith."'1 8 Current judicial interpretation
of the Hyde Amendment standard of vexatiousness, frivolousness,
and bad faith indicates a standard of conduct for federal prosecu-
tors that requires them to present charges supported by law and by
facts and not use their authority to prosecute for wrongful pur-
115. See Meares, supra note 21, at 901 ("[I]t is a common sense proposition that
serious sanctioning of prosecutors on a more regular basis would affect their conduct
and, correspondingly, their level of misconduct."); Heller, supra note 9, at 1328-31
(acknowledging the economic pressure disfavoring judicial review but arguing that
judges are only succumbing to a fear of "too much justice") (citations omitted).
116. Gleeson, supra note 15, at 427 (describing judges as "more experienced, more
dispassionate, better able to weigh the investigators' legitimate interests... and, pre-
sumably, wiser," but concluding that judges should not supervise criminal
investigations).
117. See discussion supra Part I.C.3.
118. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519
(1998).
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poses, 119 though it does not condemn "simple negligence and be-
nign prosecutorial misjudgment.' 2 0
Courts have found that Congress intended the Hyde Amend-
ment to impose a standard of conduct on federal prosecutors dif-
ferent from the substantially justified standard established by the
EAJA upon which the Hyde Amendment is based.121 The final
language of the Hyde Amendment specifically rejects the substan-
tially justified standard by adopting the procedures and limitations
of the EAJA but not its burden of proof.' 22 Therefore, the defen-
dant bringing the Hyde Amendment claim must show more than
that the government's position was not substantially justified.1 2 3
1. Violating the Law Satisfies the Hyde Amendment Standard
In interpreting the Hyde Amendment standard, some courts
limit awards of attorneys' fees to instances when the government's
position resembles one of the examples listed by Congressman
Hyde during the House debate over the Hyde Amendment: failure
to disclose information as obligated, failure to disclose exculpatory
information, subornation of perjury, and a lack of justification for
bringing the suit.124 Therefore, violations of existing law, such as
the Brady doctrine (which requires the government to provide the
defendant with any exculpatory evidence it possesses), 25 suffi-
ciently demonstrate a bad faith government position. 26
119. United States v. Gardner, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1295 (N.D. Okla. 1998). The
court evaluates the following conduct: 1) "conduct that is clearly unsupported by
law;" 2) "conduct that is clearly unsupported by facts;" and 3) "use of the charge for
wrongful purposes." Id.
120. United States v. Peterson, 71 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
121. Supra note 89 and accompanying text; EAJA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (1994).
122. "Such awards shall be granted pursuant to the procedures and limitations (but
not the burden of proof) provided for an award under section 2412 of title 28, United
States Code." § 617, 111 Stat. at 2440-2519.
123. United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898, 908-09 (5th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Lindberg, No. 99-10371, 2000 WL 1028929, at *3-4 (9th Cir. July 27, 2000).
124. United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1304 (11th Cir. 1999).
125. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963); supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
126. The District Court for the District of West Virginia, hearing a Hyde Amend-
ment claim in United States v. Troisi, found that it is the "duty of a prosecutor to know
about and disclose evidence favorable to a person accused." 13 F. Supp. 2d 595, 596
(N.D. W. Va. 1998) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). In United
States v. Ranger Elec. Communications, the District Court for the Western District of
Michigan found that the prosecutor's failure to reveal exculpatory evidence qualified
as a bad faith position under the Hyde Amendment and justified an award of attor-
ney's fees. 22 F. Supp. 2d 667, 676 (W.D. Mich. 1998), rev'd 210 F.3d 627 (6th Cir.
2000) (finding that in waiver of sovereign immunity, procedural requirements need to
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Similarly, according to OPR, an intentional wrongful act or dis-
regard of duties or obligations constitutes prosecutorial misconduct
justifying sanctions. 127 Therefore, an intentional violation of the
obligation to disclose exculpatory information qualifies as
prosecutorial misconduct, while failure to disclose exculpatory in-
formation because of a reasonable belief in its non-discoverability
or lack of legitimacy does not.128 While the Hyde Amendment of-
fers an additional remedy of attorneys' fees not offered by the
Principles, ethics rules, and Brady doctrine, in this area it adds
nothing to the body of law and regulation on which federal prose-
cutors rely to understand the breadth of their discretion.
2. Hyde Amendment Requires Prosecutors to Bring Charges
with Sufficient Legal and Factual Basis
Under current interpretations of the Hyde Amendment, a fed-
eral prosecution is vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith if it lacks a
sufficient factual and legal basis (meaning a total lack of supporting
evidence). In one Hyde Amendment case involving the Federal
Deposit and Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the court reviewed
whether the FDIC's criminal referrals of the defendants and a sub-
sequent federal prosecution were vexatious, frivolous, or in bad
faith.12 9 According to the court, the government owed the defend-
ants attorneys' fees if "a reasonable FDIC decision-maker and a
reasonable [p]rosecutor knew or should have known that the crimi-
nal referrals and the continued prosecution were 'lacking justifica-
tion [and] ... intended to harass ... by process of law."13° With
be strictly adhered to; since claimants filed after thirty-day time limit, the award must
be revoked).
127. 1998 REPORT, supra note 74, at Examples of Matters Investigated by OPR in
Fiscal Year 1998 ex. 1 (finding reckless disregard of prosecutorial obligation in failure
to produce discoverable material requested by defendant).
128. FRATTALONE INVESTIGATION, supra note 74 (finding prosecutorial misconduct
because of prosecutor's failure to inform defendant that possible witness to her inno-
cence was located); but see IsGRo INVESTIGATION, supra note 74 (reprimanding pros-
ecutor for failure to adequately investigate duty to disclose requested evidence); 1994
REPORT, supra note 74. Mistakes and carelessness constituting a pattern of conduct of
reckless disregard for prosecutorial obligations, though not intentional, can also con-
stitute prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., 1997 REPORT, supra note 73; 1998 REPORT,
supra note 74.
129. United States v. Holland 34 F. Supp. 2d 346, 359 (E.D. Va. 1999) (indicating
one element of Hyde Amendment analysis is whether the defendants proved that
"the FDIC or the Prosecution was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith"), affd, 214
F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2000).
130. Id. at 360. In the Northern District of West Virginia, the court also applied the
reasonable person test to determine whether the "Government's action was justified
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respect to the federal prosecutor, the court found the prosecution
vexatious because of the insufficiency of evidence in light of the
applicable law and inability of the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.13 1 The court indicated the impropriety of the
prosecutor's reliance on FDIC evidence to support a claim of crim-
inal conduct, 132 for he knew or should have known that the evi-
dence failed to support the charges. The prosecutor clearly
thought that pursuing prosecution would only harass the defend-
ants and not serve any criminal justice goals. 133
Similarly, in United States v. Knott,13 4 the District Court for the
District of Massachusetts found a prosecution vexatious because
the government lacked evidence to support the Clean Water Act
violation charge and also knew of the lack of supporting evi-
dence.135 After suppressing much of the government's evidence
and reviewing that which remained, 36 the court determined that
the government pursued charges despite its knowledge that it
lacked supporting evidence and failed to obtain evidence that
would have hurt the case from the appropriate discharge site.
137
The government admitted that once most of the sampling informa-
tion was suppressed, it had insufficient evidence to proceed to trial
though "there was substantial evidence supporting the charges. "138
The court referred to the defendant's "humiliation at being crimi-
nally prosecuted" and the government's harassment of the defen-
to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person, and whether a reasonable basis in
both law and fact existed." Troisi, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
131. Holland, 34 F. Supp. 2d, at 364. The prosecution relied on the FDIC's evi-
dence, which the FDIC deemed insufficient to pursue civil penalties, which require a
lower burden of proof than criminal offenses. Id. The evidence did not demonstrate
the requisite intent and, according to the court, the prosecution seemed to be follow-
ing the FDIC's "in terrorem" policy in pursuing a thirty-one-count indictment. Id. The
court cited the prosecutor's knowledge of the lack of evidence; duplication of counts
based on the same statutes; failure to present supporting evidence for charges; failure
to adhere to representations as to intended actions; failure to recognize obvious con-
flicts in the pleadings as filed by defendants' attorney; and a conflict in representation
to support its finding of vexatious and frivolous prosecution. Id. at 364-68.
132. Id. at 365.
133. Id. at 364.
134. 106 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D. Mass. 2000).
135. Id. at 179-80.
136. Id. at 176. The court suppressed the evidence from the second sampling taken
by Environmental Protection Agency investigators without supervision because "EPA
exceeded the scope of [defendant's] consent." Id.
137. Id. at 179 (violating the Clean Water Act requires proof that the defendant
discharged industrial waste with a pH of less than 5.0 S.U. into the publicly owned
treatment works).
138. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
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dant by sending "a virtual 'SWAT team' ... [to] the [defendant's]
facility," in finding that the prosecution, "although not provably
frivolous or in bad faith was clearly vexatious.' 1 39 The govern-
ment's inappropriate investigative methods, lack of supporting evi-
dence, and harassment of the defendant, according to the court,
warranted an award of attorneys' fees under the Hyde
Amendment.140
In enforcing the DOJ Principles, OPR reviews federal prosecu-
tors' decisions to bring charges under a sufficiency of the evidence
standard, Which demands that federal prosecutors should not bring
charges if they do not reasonably believe they have supporting evi-
dence.' 4' In the Kanter Investigation,42 OPR evaluated the legiti-
macy of the prosecutor investigating a defense attorney during the
prosecution of the defense attorney's client. 43 OPR questioned
whether the prosecutor had a basis for pursuing the investiga-
tion, 44 and in the decision held that the prosecutor "had a suffi-
cient factual and legal basis for undertaking and continuing the
investigation" and therefore did not commit misconduct. 45 The
decision further explained that the prosecutor acted with the ap-
proval of the United States Attorney, and therefore did not exer-
cise poor judgment in pursuing the investigation.146 Interestingly,
the government did not challenge the district court's criticism of
the investigation as improper, allowing Chief Judge Richard Pos-
ner, writing on behalf of a Seventh Circuit panel, to conclude that
the government had conceded the "ineptitude of its investiga-
tion.' 1 47 Nevertheless, OPR did not find any evidence of miscon-
duct on the part of the prosecutor and determined that he had
139. Id. at 180.
140. Id. at 179-80. In United States v. Gilbert, the District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia decided that a prosecution "without any foundation or basis
for belief that it might prevail" qualified as in bad faith. 198 F.3d 1293, 1303 (11th Cir.
1999). See also United States v. Adkinson, 247 F.3d 1289, 1292-93 (11'h Cir. 2001)
(finding prosecution of defendant on conspiracy charges vexatious, frivolous, and in
bad faith' because the government's position was "foreclosed by binding precedents").
141. FRELS INVESTICATION, supra note 71; KANTER INVESTIGATION, supra note 72;
See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
142. KANTER INVESTIGATION, supra note 72.
143. Id.
144. Id. at Conclusions of the Office of Professional Responsibility.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at Facts.
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sufficient basis to believe the defense attorney may have engaged
in unlawful conduct that merited investigation. 148
Both the United States Constitution, through its prohibition of
selective or vindictive prosecutions,149 and the Principles, through
their admonition against pursuing prosecution out of personal vin-
dictiveness and establishment of the sufficiency of the evidence
standard, 5 ° prohibit federal prosecutors from seeking an indict-
ment for any reason other than that the facts and law warrant do-
ing so. 5 1 The courts in Holland and Knott reasoned that a desire
to harass the defendants, rather than probable cause, motivated
both of the prosecutions at issue in those cases.' 52 The prosecutors'
conduct in Holland and Knott, therefore, would have warranted
sanctions for violations of the mandate that prosecutors must have
a reasonable belief in the sufficiency of the legal and factual basis
for charges, and that they may not pursue a prosecution out of vin-
dictiveness or retaliation, regardless of the existence of the Hyde
Amendment.
3. Negligent Conduct Does Not Satisfy the Hyde
Amendment Standard
In a recent Hyde Amendment case described at the beginning of
this Comment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that even though the federal prosecutor would have
realized the evidence in his possession did not support the charges
had he reviewed it more carefully, the defendant still failed to meet
the requisite standard of proof to collect attorney's fees.'5 3 The
case involved criminal contempt charges resulting from an alleged
threat the defendant made to the grand jury.' 54 The federal prose-
cutor's case rested on the transcript of the grand jury proceedings
and the testimony of the grand jury foreman.1 55 The facts reported
by the court indicated that the government could have earlier ob-
148. Id. at Conclusions of the Office of Professional Responsibility; see also FRELS
INVESTIGATION, supra note 71 at Conclusions of the Office of Professional Responsi-
bility (finding that the prosecutor "had sufficient evidence to prosecute [and] the case
met the Department's prosecutive standards").
149. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
150. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 10, at 9-27.260.
151. The Principles specifically prohibit pursuing prosecution for reasons other
than those warranted by the facts. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
152. United States v. Knott, 106 F. Supp. 2d 174, 180 (D. Mass. 2000); United States
v. Holland, 34 F. Supp. 2d 346, 367 (E.D. Va. 1999).
153. In re 1997 Grand Jury, 215 F.3d 430, 437 (4th Cir. 2000).
154. Id. at 432.
155. Id.
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tained the evidence that eventually led to it dropping charges.156
The court determined that although the prosecutor may have been
negligent in failing to conduct a more in-depth investigation, the
decision to prosecute did not rise to the level of ill intent. 57
Rather, the court held that the prosecutor had a reasonable basis
for proceeding against the defendant and did not act vexatiously,
frivolously, or in bad faith.158
OPR has deferred to the prosecutor's reasonable belief in the
integrity of witnesses and evidence in withholding a finding of
prosecutorial misconduct despite the fact that the prosecutor relied
on evidence containing false information.159 The office investi-
gated an allegation that the prosecutor used testimony at a hearing
he knew or should have known was false, and documents he knew
or should have known contained false information. 60 While OPR
concluded that one of the documents used as evidence did contain
false information, it also found that the attorney acted appropri-
ately in using the document because it contained materially factual
information.16' Using a reasonableness test, OPR determined that
the prosecutor's actions did not constitute prosecutorial miscon-
duct.1 62 According to the OPR decision, the prosecutor reasonably
believed in the truthfulness of the witnesses and evidence, and that
reasonable belief was sufficient to overcome the inappropriateness
of using false information. 63
Other courts have decided that prosecutors' negligence in con-
firming the legal basis for the charges does not violate the Hyde
Amendment standard. In United States v. Truesdale,64 the govern-
ment's failure to charge the appropriate parts of the relevant stat-
ute subjected the defendants to a conviction that they narrowly
escaped on appeal. 65 With respect to the Hyde Amendment
claim, the court explained that the government's allegations fo-
cused entirely on bookmaking, yet the cited statute referred to
156. Id. at 432-33.
157. Id. at 437.
158. Id. at 436-37.
159. 1998 REPORT, supra note 74 (investigating charge of subornation of perjury,
OPR found the attorney reasonably did not know the material was false and had
reason to believe it was true). The reported decision does not indicate the basis for a
finding of reasonable belief or the level of investigation necessary for such holding. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 211 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
165. Id. at 900-01.
1992
THE HYDE AMENDMENT
gambling promotion, which includes more than just bookmak-
ing.' 66 The court overturned the convictions because the circum-
stantial evidence was inadequate to convince a reasonable jury that
the defendants were engaged in bookmaking, and the government
failed to charge the section of the statute supported by the evi-
dence.' 67 "[T]here was some evidence that Appellants had broken
state gambling laws ... but the government neglected to proceed
on this theory.' 1 68 The appellate court acknowledged that the gov-
ernment's investigation was both confused and sloppy, but rea-
soned that it did not rise to the level of vexatious, frivolous, or bad
faith conduct.
169
In evaluating the legal sufficiency of charges, OPR does not re-
quire that the prosecutor demonstrate the legal basis for the
charge.7° In one case, OPR investigated a court of appeals finding
that the government was derelict in failing to notify the district
court that no case law supported the charges in the indictment.' 7 '
OPR determined that the defendant's pre-sentence motion in-
formed the district court that no legal authority existed for the
charges and the government told the court of appeals that no case
law was on point.'17  Because of these circumstances, OPR found
no prosecutorial misconduct in the DOJ attorney's failure to tell
the district court that the indictment lacked supporting case law.
173
In these cases, the courts and OPR reprimanded the prosecutors
for sloppiness and incomplete investigation, but did not find
prosecutorial misconduct. Despite the ability of the federal prose-
cutor to have avoided the mistake, the court and OPR considered
the action merely negligent, and therefore not worthy of sanction.
166. Id. at 901.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 909.
169. Id. The claimant argued that the government's position was not substantially
justified, but the court found that the Hyde Amendment standard is higher. Since the
claimant failed to satisfy the lower standard, he certainly did not satisfy the higher
standard. Id. at 908.
170. Green, supra note 41, at 86-87 (discussing OPR's finding in the Isgro case).
171. 1994 REPORT, supra note 74, at Matters in which Allegations were Found to be
Unsubstantiated. The appellate court found that the statute upon which the indict-
ment was based did not cover the facts at issue and the prosecutor should have noti-
fied the district court that the indictment lacked any legal authority. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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D. Current Inadequacies of the Hyde Amendment
In addition to the current failure of the courts to set a clearer
standard of conduct for prosecutors through their interpretation of
the Hyde Amendment, the Hyde Amendment itself fails to deter
prosecutors from bringing vexatious, frivolous, or bad faith
charges. While the Hyde Amendment may introduce some nomi-
nal factors for prosecutors to consider when making their discre-
tionary decisions, these factors are effectively irrelevant because of
their limited application and remoteness to individual prosecutors.
Few critics have highlighted the limited deterrent effect of the
Hyde Amendment and none have reacted to the fact that current
judicial interpretation of the Hyde Amendment standard does not
set a higher standard of conduct for prosecutors conducting their
investigations than preexisting legal standards.
1. Introduces Appropriate Financial Considerations with
Limited Effect
If the government feels a financial pinch from Hyde Amendment
awards, federal agencies may somehow shift the Hyde Amendment
losses to their prosecutors, or they may exert an internal sanction
on a prosecutor for failing to rise above a vexatious, frivolous, or
bad faith position.174 Yet, as it stands, the financial burden of the
Hyde Amendment is imposed on the government agency and not
the individual.1 75 It is premature to assume that the government
will impose the cost of satisfying Hyde Amendment claims on its
employees. Such an assumption ignores the administrative costs
involved in determining which prosecutor or prosecutors should
bear the financial burden and how the prosecutor will satisfy the
cost.
According to Leslie Hagin, counsel and chief lobbyist for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Hyde
Amendment restores some balance to a system that otherwise fa-
vors the prosecutor by using a financial disincentive to discourage
the government from trying a case with less than sufficient evi-
dence. 176 Defendants need to consider their pocketbooks when de-
174. Abramowitz & Scher, supra note 14, at 24 (describing how the Hyde Amend-
ment shifts the economic pressure to the prosecutor's office).
175. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519
(1998). "Fees and other expenses awarded ... shall be paid by the agency." Id.
176. Compare Goldman, supra note 82, with Meares, supra note 21, at 873 (sug-
gesting the use of financial rewards to encourage prosecutors to charge defendants
only with crimes they believe they can prove at trial).
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ciding how to proceed against an imminent prosecution, whether
justified or not.177 It is appropriate to require the federal prosecu-
tor to undergo a similar consideration. 78 However, under the
Hyde Amendment, the prosecutor is only encouraged to make
such a consideration with respect to defendants who have retained
counsel.' 79 The Hyde Amendment further limits its remedy with a
monetary worth restriction that keeps criminal defendants having a
net worth of more than two hundred thousand dollars and corpora-
tions having more than 500 employees and a net worth of more
than seven million dollars from collecting attorneys' fees under this
provision. 180 Since most criminal defendants do not retain private
counsel, 81 the Hyde Amendment is doing little to equalize the
playing field at least from a financial perspective. A financial cal-
culation is a reasonable, necessary, and objective consideration rel-
evant to the decision to charge, 82 which should be expanded to
include all criminal defendants.
Unlike judicial sanctions, OPR investigations, or disciplinary au-
thority reviews, the Hyde Amendment allows defendants to bring a
complaint regarding the prosecutor's conduct during the original
criminal prosecution. The opportunity for recourse empowers de-
fendants after a completely enfeebling experience from which they
have little remedy. The psychological impact of having your "day
in court" should not be minimized. Therefore, all criminal defend-
ants should have access to this remedy. The Hyde Amendment
should be changed in order to allow indigent defendants to collect
attorneys' fees, with the proceeds going to the appropriate Public
Defender or court fund used to compensate their counsel. 183
Expanding application of the Hyde Amendment will not result
in additional litigation, as defendants have a compelling financial
incentive not to bring a Hyde Amendment claim.' 84 It is an addi-
177. Abramowitz & Scher, supra note 14, at 24.
178. Id.; see generally Meares, supra note 21 (suggesting that implementing finan-
cial incentives will help assure proper prosecutions are pursued).
179. § 617, 111 Stat. at 2519.
180. Id. The courts are split as to whether these EAJA limitations apply to Hyde
Amendment claims. See, e.g., United States v. Knott, 106 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D. Mass.
2000); United States v. Peterson, 71 F. Supp. 2d 695 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
181. Meares, supra note 21, at 879 (citing that seventy-five percent of defendants
have appointed counsel).
182. See generally Meares, supra note 21; but see Goldman, supra note 82 (referring
to DOJ's concerns regarding imposition of financial considerations).
183. Simon, supra note 17, at 56-57 (proposing that Congress expand the Hyde
Amendment to include larger corporations and those prosecuted in state courts).
184. Goldman, supra note 82 (explaining that litigation is an expensive alternative
to entering into a plea agreement).
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tional cost coming on the heels of a costly criminal prosecution and
the defendant carries the burden of proof.185 The effort to collect
attorney's fees will come only from a strong belief in the correct-
ness of the claim and the defendant's ability to support the claim.
Furthermore, if courts use the Hyde Amendment to set a higher
standard of conduct for prosecutors, less people should have rea-
son to bring Hyde Amendment claims.
2. The Hyde Amendment Offers a Limited Financial Remedy
After defending oneself against a criminal prosecution, a defen-
dant has suffered a great deal of harm, most of which is irrepara-
ble.18 6 Spending time in jail, enduring intrusive investigation, and
responding to negative public attention affect one's psyche and
reputation.187 There may be loss of friends, family, job, or valua-
ble opportunities. The government cannot repair one's reputation,
reverse time, revive lost friendships, or recover missed job oppor-
tunities, but it can repay the cost of defending against an improper
prosecution. While this may seem insignificant in light of the dam-
age inflicted upon a wrongfully prosecuted person, it at least pro-
vides some remedy to a wrongly indicted or convicted defendant.1 88
At the very least, the person can avoid bankruptcy and have a
place from which to rebuild his or her life.'8 9
However, this positive outcome from a successful Hyde Amend-
ment claim is limited to prevailing criminal defendants with private
counsel and to those meeting restrictive financial requirements.190
Additionally, under existing interpretation of the Hyde Amend-
ment, even fewer defendants will enjoy this potential financial rem-
edy because the courts find Hyde Amendment violations only in
cases where other statutes already prohibit the challenged behav-
185. Abramowitz, supra note 9.
186. See discussion supra Part L.A,
187. The potential impact of public condemnation is limited because the burden of
paying attorneys' fees is placed on the agency and not the individual prosecutor.
"Fees and other expenses awarded under this provision to a party shall be paid by the
agency over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency by
appropriation." Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440,
2519 (1998).
188. Simon, supra note 17, at 57 ("[T]he statute is a powerful tool for successful
criminal defendants who have been victimized by federal government overreaching.
Lawyers representing criminal defendants ... now have at least one possible answer
when their acquitted client asks, 'What next?"').
189. See HEARINGS, supra note 82, at H7791; see also Part II.A.
190. § 617, 111 Stat., at 2519; see supra notes 179 and accompanying text.
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ior.191 Even if a client has a potentially winning Hyde Amendment
claim, he or she will still have to endure the hardship of criminal
prosecution and prevail in that prosecution before being able to
bring a claim. At that point, all the Hyde Amendment can offer is
a monetary remedy.
III. THE COURTS COULD Do MORE: SETTING A CLEARER
STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR
PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATION
Current judicial interpretation of the Hyde Amendment stan-
dard sets the same standard of conduct as pre-existing laws, regula-
tions, and guidelines. If Congress meant to limit the Hyde
Amendment to the standard set by pre-existing laws and regula-
tions, the law would so indicate. Instead, Congress set forth an
independent standard of vexatiousness, frivolousness, and bad faith
and did not specifically say that only a Brady violation or suborna-
tion of perjury should result in an award of attorneys' fees.192 The
courts need to seize this opportunity to define what is a legitimate
exercise of the charging decision and outline for federal prosecu-
tors the extent to which they should investigate and review evi-
dence before exercising their charging discretion.
A. Where to Begin? The Plain Meaning of "Vexatious,
Frivolous, and in Bad Faith"
Most courts begin their discussion of the Hyde Amendment
standard of conduct for prosecutors by defining the clear meaning
of the terms.193 The plain meaning of the phrase "vexatious, frivo-
lous, and bad faith" connotes a prosecution "of little weight or im-
portance," a "groundless lawsuit with little prospect of success
often brought to embarrass or annoy the defendant" and "the con-
scious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral ob-
liquity. '' 194 "'Vexatious,' 'frivolous' and 'bad faith' are words that
imply something more [than an overbroad subpoena], something
malicious and sinister, designed to annoy or embarrass," as in, for
191. See discussion supra Part II.C.
192. Compare 111 Stat. 2440, 2519, with HEARINGS, supra note 82, at H7791 (listing
subornation of perjury and failure to disclose exculpatory information as examples of
prosecutorial conduct justifying award of attorneys' fees).
193. Welle, supra note 13, at 370-72 (stating that it is difficult to define the standard
as the precedent does little to help).
194. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 134 (7th ed. 1999) (bad faith), 677 (frivolous), 1559
(vexatious).
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example, dishonesty.1 95 "The essence of bad faith for purposes of
this fee-shifting rule is egregious misconduct that impinges upon
the integrity of the judicial process.' 96 The dictionary definition of
the terms, however, is not the only guidance the courts have in
giving meaning to the broad language of the Hyde Amendment.
Relying on the Congressional record, courts have rejected a
mere showing that the government's position was not substantially
justified as sufficient to demonstrate vexatious, frivolous, or bad
faith, and have required defendants to show more than that the
government lacked a reasonable basis in law and fact for pursuing
charges, and that a reasonable person could not think the charges
were correct. 197 However, if the person bringing a Hyde Amend-
ment claim demonstrates that the federal prosecutor's position was
"made without a reasonable and competent inquiry," then the
claimant will have shown that the prosecutor failed to satisfy, at a
minimum, the frivolous element of the Hyde Amendment stan-
dard. 1 98 A reasonable and competent inquiry should include exam-
ination of evidence in the prosecutor's possession. When federal
195. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 31 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544-45 (N.D. W.
Va. 1998).
196. Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court
Awards of Attorney's Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 LA.
L. REV. 1, 57 (1995).
197. See discussion supra Part II.C. According to the United States Supreme Court,
substantially justified indicates having a reasonable basis in law and in fact. Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1988) (explaining that the government's position was
"substantially justified" if it "had a reasonable basis both in law and in fact") (cita-
tions omitted). "'[J]ustified in substance or in the main'-that is, justified to a degree
that could satisfy a reasonable person." Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565 (citation omitted). This
requires more than what is needed to avoid sanctions for frivolousness, but not so
much as to convince one of the correctness of the position, as long as one may reason-
ably think the position is correct. Id. at 563-68.
198. Samuel J. Levine, Seeking a Common Language for the Application of Rule 11
Sanctions: What is "Frivolous"?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 677, 682-83 (1999) (referring to
meaning of frivolous as held in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136,
1140 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted). A frivolous claim under Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 11") involves bringing a claim for
which "it is patently clear that [the] claim has absolutely no chance of success," a
claim "'that is both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry,'"
or a claim with "'no factual or legal basis at all.'" Id. (quoting Townsend v. Holman
Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1990), Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533, 538
(11th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted), Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985). While many acknowledge that there is no clear
and consistent meaning of frivolous in the Rule 11 context, one analysis suggests that
in evaluating cases for frivolousness, courts should recognize that cases exist along a
continuum from the clearly frivolous to the clearly non-frivolous. Id. at 687-89 (ex-
plaining that many cases lie in between the two extremes, so it is often difficult to
determine if Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate).
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prosecutors to ignore such pertinent and available evidence, they
are acting frivolously and in bad faith, bringing charges that are
baseless and the result of incompetent inquiries. 199 This Comment
proposes that courts, through their interpretation of the Hyde
Amendment standard, should require federal prosecutors to con-
duct an investigation broad enough to include review of evidence
on hand and, by extension, to reveal evidence readily available and
potentially exculpatory or risk having their prosecution deemed
vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. Such a standard is within the
plain meaning of the terms and allows courts to fill a gap in
prosecutorial regulation left by pre-existing laws and regulations.
B. The Next Step: Developing a Principle to Guide Prosecutors
in Exercising Their Charging Discretion
Prosecutors have very broad and autonomous discretion in the
charging decision.2 °° There are minimal guidelines provided by the
Principles and the probable cause requirement for how extensive
an investigation the prosecutor should conduct before making a
charging decision. 20 1 Although prosecutors are expected to have a
sufficient basis in law and fact before pursuing an investigation or
prosecution, 20 2 courts and OPR have only sanctioned attorneys
who have brought cases they knew had no evidentiary support.20 3
As a regulation of or check on prosecutorial discretion and abuse
of power, probable cause is ineffective.20 4 Probable cause does not
explain what step the prosecutor must reach to have gone far
enough in the investigation.20 5 Therefore, the prosecutor may sat-
isfy probably cause by speaking to only one eyewitness while there
may be five other eyewitnesses who would tell a different story.2 °6
With a little probing, the prosecutor may discover a piece of evi-
199. Id. (referring to Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp. 914 F.2d 1136, 1140
(9th Cir. 1990)).
200. Moore, supra note 11, at 374; see discussion supra Part I.A.
201. Little, supra note 2, at 740-41 (stating that the ethical codes and the DOJ Man-
ual say nothing about prosecutorial investigation and suggesting a proportionality rule
to minimize the harm investigations can cause).
202. Flowers, supra note 24, at 938 (explaining that probable cause is different from
a reasonable belief that charges can be substantiated with admissible evidence).
203. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
204. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
205. English, supra note 3, at 533 (describing two views of the probable cause
standard).
206. Gleeson, supra note 15, at 425 ("[T]he rules of procedure in federal court per-
mit prosecutors to seek convictions based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single
accomplice witness.") (citation omitted).
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dence indicating that the elements of the crime are not evident,
thus making prosecution inappropriate. Recognizing the leniency
of the probable cause standard, Congress specified that a grand
jury indictment does not preclude a Hyde Amendment claim or a
finding that the federal prosecutor violated the Hyde Amendment
standard and maintained a vexatious, frivolous, or bad faith
position.2 °7
Courts can use the Hyde Amendment standard to push prosecu-
tors further along the evidence continuum and require a fuller in-
vestigation before bringing charges than the probable cause and
sufficiency of the evidence standards currently demand. Courts
may reasonably interpret the Hyde Amendment standard of vexa-
tiousness, frivolousness, and bad faith to require that the federal
prosecutor do more than interview one witness to acquire readily
available evidence and do more to ensure that the proper charges
are prosecuted in light of the available evidence. The standard for
investigation should set an expectation that the prosecutor must
discover and review readily available evidence such as evidence on
hand or reasonably acquired. The integrity of the judicial process
is threatened when prosecutors ignore evidence or fail to pursue
potentially exculpatory evidence. The federal prosecutor as a
"minister of justice" serves both the victim and the defendant 20 8
and concern for the public's safety and welfare should guide the
prosecutor's decision making.20 9 The prosecutor cannot fully pur-
sue justice and effectively represent both the victim and the defen-
dant if the prosecutor fails to fully investigate before bringing
charges.
For example, the prosecutor litigating the underlying criminal
suit implicated in In re 1997 Grand Jury210 sought an indictment on
the basis of witness testimony without reviewing the available audi-
otape of the grand jury proceeding, which demonstrated the defen-
dant's innocence.2 11 Although, probable cause was satisfied, the
court reviewing the Hyde Amendment claim should have found
that the prosecution was vexatious, frivolous, and in bad faith be-
cause the prosecutor failed to examine exculpatory evidence in his
possession. Exculpatory evidence was readily available and the
207. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
208. United States v. Ranger Elec. Communications, 22 F. Supp. 2d 667, 673 (W.D.
Mich. 1999); English, supra note 3, at 529-30; Flowers, supra note 24, at 933-34.
209. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 10, at 9-27.001.
210. 215 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2000).
211. Id. at 432-33.
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prosecutor failed to uncover it until after the indictment because
nothing required or suggested that the prosecutor should do more
than establish probable cause before bringing charges.212 The
Hyde Amendment gives courts the opportunity to demand that
prosecutors, in order to demonstrate probable cause for charging
purposes, examine all the evidence in their possession prior to
charging someone. Therefore, when circumstances similar to those
addressed in In re 1997 Grand Jury arise, a court should find that
the failure to review evidence in the prosecutor's possession consti-
tutes a vexatious, frivolous, and bad faith prosecution. Prosecutors
must examine evidence in their possession before bringing charges.
Such an interpretation of the Hyde Amendment standard helps ad-
vance the ball on developing clearer guidelines for prosecutors ex-
ercising their broad charging discretion.
In the case In re 1997 Grand Jury, the prosecutor's reliance on a
witness's memory, rather than the audio recording of the proceed-
ings, resulted in a groundless lawsuit for which the court should
have remedied the defendant. Awarding attorney's fees would
have repaired some of the harm to the defendant and, perhaps
more importantly, would have prevented future failures to fully in-
vestigate available evidence by setting a firm standard by which
federal prosecutors should abide in conducting their pre-charging
investigation. The intent of the Hyde Amendment was to "protect
citizens from the devastating effects of wrongful prosecutions. '213
For the Hyde Amendment to achieve that goal, courts must give
the standard some meaning independent of the requirements of
other laws and regulations.
Not all cases involve a situation where diligence with respect to
review of evidence on hand is enough to prevent wrongful prosecu-
tions. Courts can extend this principle of diligence with respect to
consideration of evidence on hand to require prosecutors to obtain
readily available evidence having the potential to rebut the charges
or demonstrate the person's innocence. Such an opportunity arose
in United States v. Truesdale when the Fifth Circuit reversed the
charges partly because the federal prosecutor's charge failed to cite
the correct provision of the gambling statute.214 In that case, a
212. English, supra note 3, at 532-38 (suggesting that the prosecutor's role in find-
ing probable cause could require the prosecutor to be personally satisfied as to guilt);
Morton, supra note 14, at 1105-07 (indicating that courts have nowhere to turn to
discipline prosecutors).
213. Abramowitz & Scher, supra note 14, at 24.
214. United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
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more in-depth investigation would have informed the prosecutor
about the lack of evidence supporting the charges, and a more in-
formed legal position would have resulted in the prosecutor bring-
ing the appropriate charges.21 5 By demanding a fuller investigation
of the legal and factual evidence by the prosecutor in Truesdale
before pursuing prosecution, the criminal justice system could have
saved vast resources and the defendants could have avoided the
trauma of criminal prosecution and conviction. Instead, all the
damage and harms of prosecution occurred without furthering the
pursuit of justice and protecting the public safety. In the future,
courts should find that a failure to inspect reasonably available evi-
dence before charging someone constitutes vexatious, frivolous,
and bad faith prosecution.
Courts must demand that federal prosecutors pursue convictions
only when supported by law and facts, as indicated by a complete
pre-charging investigation of evidence on hand and reasonably
available evidence. The court should convey to prosecutors that
failure to insure the existence of legal and factual support for
charges results in a vexatious and frivolous prosecution that the
court will find was brought in bad faith. The federal prosecutor
should know whether the government's position lacks a foundation
before bringing charges because a full investigation of evidence on
hand and reasonably available evidence occurred.216 The court's
evaluation of the quality and extent of the investigation can deter-
mine what the prosecutor knew or should have known. A finding
by the court that the prosecutor failed to consider readily available
factual evidence or did not review the state of the law to determine
if it supported the charges would indicate a vexatious, frivolous, or
bad faith prosecution. Otherwise, the criminal justice system is
only a tool for the powerful prosecutor to harass the less powerful
criminal defendant.
CONCLUSION
Broad prosecutorial discretion on occasion leads to abuse of
power, which Congress, the courts, and DOJ try to prevent through
215. Id. But see United States v. Sherburne, 249 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding prosecution not vexatious when evidence of innocence comes to light after
trial and no defendant presents any evidence indicating prosecutor ignored this new
evidence prior to trial).
216. English, supra note 3, at 536-37 (explaining the view that prosecutors should
do work at the beginning of the investigatory stage and convince themselves beyond a
reasonable doubt).
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a variety of legal and regulatory mechanisms. However, abuses of
power continue to occur, and Congress passed the Hyde Amend-
ment to address just such abuses of power. By offering criminal
defendants recourse and remedy and introducing a clearer stan-
dard of conduct for prosecutors, the Hyde Amendment provides
courts with an opportunity to use judicial review to guide
prosecutorial discretion objectively and effectively. Courts should
take advantage of this opportunity to establish a more exact stan-
dard of conduct for prosecutors conducting investigations and
thereby offer defendants needed financial reimbursement after a
vexatious, frivolous, or bad faith prosecution.
I As
